I think the shift to game reasoning is not problematic, so long as the society that the game reasoning is abstracted from is inherently an impositional society where individual nature is inhibited in favor of causing them to display exhibitional behaviors that are advantageous to a perceived higher moral authority that people share subservience to.
Let moral reasoning be the standard set of morals that one develops by living in a just society which is rule-governed, where people differentiate right actions from wrong actions and develop beliefs that guide what actions they take. Game reasoning, then, is described in Bredemeier’s article when quoting Erving Goffman who, “has described play activities as [being] enclosed within a unique “social membrane” or conceptual “frame,”” where Bredemeier says these activities ensure that, “Sport is set apart both cognitively and emotionally from the everyday world.” (Bredemeier 218). Bredemeier concludes that, “the fundamental structure of moral reasoning remains relatively stable in nearly all situations,” in the transition from standard moral reasoning to game reasoning (Bredemeier 220).
Bredemeier presents two descriptive viewpoints for the relationship between the two types of reasoning. The first Bredemeier summarizes as, “subordinating everyday morality to game reasoning. For him, an opponent is a player, not a person. This objectification of opponents reduces an athlete’s sense of personal responsibility for competitors.” (Bredemeier 219). For the second, Bredemeier says that, “The transformed morality that occurs in sport does not take the place of everyday morality; rather, it is embedded in the broader, more encompassing morality of daily life.” (Bredemeier 219). The latter is the focus of this discussion.
The reason that the transition isn’t problematic is because actions taken already don’t always track the absolute morals that guide one’s taken actions. There are instances where individual circumstances will yield different outcomes to different situations. This is due to different expectations of consequences of one’s actions. By following implied morals developed through interpreting authoritative law that was written in order to maintain peace in a functional moral society, one typically subscribes to interpretations in pursuit of perpetuating perceived advantageous outcomes. If individuals didn’t believe the authoritative body that they were subservient to was going to render punishment for taking immoral (often, illegal) actions that it would typically penalize an individual for, then an individual may tend to favor individually advantageous outcomes, instead. In these cases, the costs of one’s actions, which still carry some enhanced risk of aggravating the state, may lead one to perceive that the paying through surrogate punishment incurred is less than the cost of performing the action.
As Michael Smith says in a discussion on relating domestic violence to sports violence, “the severity of the penalties for violence provided by the law are widely regarded within the legal community, as well as the sports community, as out of proportion to the seriousness of the illegal acts.” (Smith 212). As Smith was discussing the proportionate costs of sports violence, what’s implied here is that instead of serving years in prison for aggravated assault and battery charges, the penalties incurred by athletes in sports for ‘illegal actions’ are instead similarly diminished (although the state is still justified in charging these people in many cases). This isn’t to imply that actions don’t have consequences, just that the typical realized consequences are reduced. Rather than serving jail time through what may otherwise be interpreted as aggravated assault by the municipality under which a crime took place, players are instead given a few minutes in a penalty box, or move back a few yards on a field, for accosting another player. Why this is, is a larger discussion that’s outside the scope of this abridged discussion of the human capacity to perform operations under the imposition of additional rule sets based on uniquely-tailored moral valuations in which there are reduced threats of penalties being imposed for otherwise immoral actions normally judged by the state. That these deviant actions taken still result in most involved being able to return to the larger order at the conclusion of the sports event generally satisfies the state’s criteria of maintaining an overall peaceful society is critical.
In support of this, Smith provides an example where he wrote, “because these aggressive urges must be vented, the argument goes, if not one way then another, prohibiting fist-fighting would result in an increase in the more vicious and dangerous illegal use of the stick.” (Smith 208). The ‘vent’ in the game is a societal value as the sports competitions mirror a vent for the spectators in that just as more violent acts may happen in different ways in the game; so too may more violent and less controlled acts happen in society, were it to be the case that each instance of a broken law in society external to it were rendered unto the offender. The point here is that it’s a societal value that the state doesn’t retain absolute control over individual lives, as it doesn’t have the requisite resources in order to impose such control (this, too, is a societal value). That sports athletes aren’t charged for the crimes they may be perceived to have committed during a competitive sports competition is an example of this value. This has implications, such as whether or not people transition into ‘alternative reasoning’ at their jobs, too.
In conclusion, the transition between alternative sets of reasoning by people isn’t unique to sports. This transition reflects individuals having additional sets of rules imposed on them, beyond the typical expectation of those expected in a normal situation. The particular nature of the transition results in outcomes that may be problematic, but these typically exhibit regard for societal values which may or may not be problematic.
Works Cited
Bredemeier, Brenda Jo, et al. “Values and Violence in Sports Today: The Moral Reasoning Athletes Use in Their Games and in Their Lives.” Sports Ethics an Anthology, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 2006, pp. 217–220.
Smith, Michael. “What Is Sports Violence?” Sports Ethics an Anthology, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 2006, pp. 199–216.